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Associational autonomy or political influence? The case of 
the cooperation between Danish Dairies’ Buttermark 
Association and the Danish state, 1900-1912 
 
 
Abstract 
Studies show that it may be risky for business associations to cooperate with the 
state. Trapped in a dilemma between a ‘logic of membership’ and a ‘logic of 
influence’, these associations may obtain political influence from cooperation but 
only at the risk of losing their associational autonomy, which often leads to 
dissatisfaction among members. This article presents an illustrative example of loss 
of associational autonomy in the context of agricultural corporatism, namely the 
cooperation between the Buttermark Association and the Danish state on a law-
supported branch trademark for all Danish butter securing high quality and 
hindering fraudulent sale and adulteration of milk – i.e., the famous lur brand 
required by Danish law from 1906 and still in use today. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The risks of close cooperation with the state  
Close cooperation between agricultural interest groups and state or supra-state 
organizations has been dominating through the 20th century and still is today, for 
example in the EU.1 However, seen from the perspective of agricultural interest 
groups and associations such cooperation is conducive to both gains and losses. 
Thus, historical studies have shown that it may be risky for voluntary business 
associations to cooperate closely with the state.2 Finding themselves in a dilemma 
between a ‘logic of influence’ and a ‘logic of membership’3, these associations may 
on the one hand profit from cooperation in the form of increased political influence, 
including influence on state regulation. On the other hand, various pay-backs to the 
state may turn out to be too costly and ultimately lead to loss of autonomy and 
dissatisfied members. 
 
1.2. Purpose, case and research question 
When estimating the positive and negative consequences of agricultural corporatism, 
we may learn important lessons from history, especially from the childhood of 
modern corporatism in the decades around 1900. Therefore, the purpose of this 
article is to shed light on agricultural corporatism in the making, using the case of the 
cooperation between the peak association, Danish Dairies’ Buttermark Association 
(Danske Mejeriers Smørmærkeforening), and the Danish Ministry of Agriculture. 
Negotiations between these two organizations led to a law of March 30, 1906 that 
required all Danish dairies to use the so-called lur brand for all Danish export butter 
and, a year later, bacon as well. Originally, the logo mirrored four interlaced Bronze 
Age lures and was from the start supposed to reflect a Danish national identity rooted 
in ancient times.4 The two words “Danish Butter” were written in-between the lures. 
 The lur brand logo is still in function today, although under the slightly altered 
name ‘Lurpak’. It still contains the words “Danish butter” but now carries a logo of 
only two lures. The logo was invented in autumn 1900, registered in England 
October 23, 1901, and from then on voluntarily applied by the large majority of 
Danish dairies – in fact by 99 pct. of all Danish dairies at the time when the use of 
the lur trademark was made statutory in March 1906. The purpose of the brand was – 
and still is – to guarantee foreign consumers the high quality of the, already at that 
time, highly esteemed Danish butter. In modern Danish agricultural history, this is 
the first example of close cooperation between state and agriculture over a longer 
period, and it turned out to be simultaneously profitable and disastrous for the Danish 
farmers, as members felt that valuable associational autonomy – an important part of 
their identity and self-picture as free, independent farmers – was traded off for 
influence on state legislation. 
 The importance of this trademark in Danish agriculture is beyond doubt. It is 
not only one of the world’s first brands within the dairy sector, but also one of the 
best known.5 This trademark, which indeed has been an important protector of ‘the 
Danish gold’, was owned by the Danish state from 1911-1997, from 1997-2012 by 
the interest organization Danish Dairy Board and since 2012 by the Danish-Swedish 
dairy group Arla Foods. Today, Lurpak butter of a value of 3 billion DKK is sold in 
more than 100 countries, during the last ten years the sale has doubled, and the 
trademark has, since its registration in England in 1901,  greatly contributed to boost 
the export of Danish butter.6  
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 Hence, using the case of the cooperation between the Buttermark Association 
(BA) and the Danish Ministry of Agriculture within the theory of a logic of 
membership vs. a logic of influence, the article addresses the question: Why did the 
Buttermark Association – and the Danish dairies and milk producers they 
represented – wish to cooperate with the state in the first place, and how did this 
cooperation develop over time? 
 
1.3. Outline 
Section 2 outlines three modes of interaction between state and interest 
organizations, as a theoretical framework for understanding the case. Then Section 3 
briefly describes the historical context and the sources used. Section 4 tells the story 
of the establishment, rise and fall of BA and discusses the implications of this case of 
agricultural corporatism. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The dilemma between associational autonomy and political influence 
2.1. Three models: pluralism, corporatism and authoritarian corporatism 
Overall, the literature on the relation between state and business interest groups 
reflects two major traditions. The first one is the pluralistic tradition, which asserts 
the importance of distinct borders between fully autonomous interest groups or 
interest associations and the state, with a focus on prevailingly provision of private 
goods by profit-maximizing lobby groups.7 The second one is the corporatist 
tradition, which asserts the importance of an ongoing cooperation, or ‘gift-giving’, 
between private/voluntary and public partners resulting in co-production of 
prevailingly collective goods. Hence, whereas the pluralist model emphasizes “the 
influence of associations on policy-makers”, the corporatist model directs focus on a 
“structured partnership between authorities and interest groups”.8 In line with this, 
this article uses John T.S. Keeler’s definition of corporatism as… 
 
a system of interest intermediation in which a limited number of groups within a sector are 
formally incorporated into the public policy-making process (…) and provided by the state 
with certain benefits in exchange for their cooperation and their restraint in the articulation of 
demands.9 
 
There is however a third model, which often tends to be ignored, namely 
relationships where “state influence on interest groups”10 prevails, that is, a form of 
statism. Such authoritarian corporatism11 can in its most extreme form be found in 
totalitarian regimes such as the Nazi regime12, fascist Italy13 or the former Eastern 
European Communist regimes14, where business and voluntary organizations after 
World War II by force were turned into (more or less) obedient state bodies and, 
hence, transformed into one single organism or ‘corpus’, namely that of the all-
encompassing state. 
 Thus we see that, instead of an either-or approach (pluralism or corporatism) 
one may argue that an analysis of interest group-state interaction should take all three 
models into consideration. This is to say that we need to study three ideal-typical 
relationships based on either balanced or unbalanced reciprocity.15  The three types 
of relationships can be summarized as follows: 
(1) The pluralist model characterized by unbalanced reciprocity, where the state loses 
more than it gains, whereas the interest group wins more than it loses, 
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(2) The corporatist model characterized by balanced reciprocity in the form of a 
balanced exchange of goods and services between two equal partners, in line with 
Keeler’s definition above, 
(3) The authoritarian corporatist model, which is also characterized by unbalanced 
reciprocity but inverted, that is, where the state is the sole winner.16 
 
2.2. The trade-off between a Logic of membership and a Logic of influence 
Seen from the perspective of the interest groups, all three modes of interaction reflect 
an inherent dilemma between a ‘logic of membership’ and a ‘logic of influence’17 
stretching at a continuum from full autonomy but low political influence to close 
cooperation with the state and high political influence but weakened autonomy, 
which potentially leads to conflicts among members and/or between members and 
leaders. Schmitter and Streeck have accordingly presented this dilemma as a trade-
off relationship18. In line with the logic of influence, possible gains from cooperation 
are organizational security, privileged access to powerful bureaucrats and politicians, 
influence on legislation and policies, and simply securing that politicians make 
decisions on the basis of full, or near full, information. In accordance with the logic 
of membership, however, cooperative strategies also contain disadvantages such as 
risk of too much state control, including over-ruling shared decisions and, in general, 
the state not keeping its promises; furthermore, risk of dissatisfied members who feel 
themselves increasingly alienated and disempowered, corruption and lack of critique 
of the government in the public media.19 This mode of interaction arguably does not 
include authoritarian corporatism in its extreme form, that is, fully state enforced 
cooperation, which typically leads to both low autonomy and low political influence. 
 Using Schmitter and Steecks’ two types of logic, Figure 1 is a model figure 
that seeks to capture the trade-off relationship between organizational autonomy and 
political influence.  
 
[Fig. 1] 
 
Assuming a linear relationship where an increase of one unit in political influence 
implies a drop of one unit in associational autonomy, the model in Figure 1 seeks to 
reduce all real world complexity.  As can be seen, balanced reciprocity is reached in 
(ideal) corporatism only, balancing associational autonomy in accordance with a 
logic of membership and political influence in accordance with a logic of influence. 
Two types of outcomes should however be seen as largely unbalanced. Within a 
logic of membership (i.e. where receptiveness to the demands of members prevails), 
we find pluralism in the form of lobbyism solely – although gift-giving in the form of 
pay-backs from lobbyist to bureaucrat ranging from lunches to large amounts of 
money might of course occur. As mentioned, the pluralist model secures high 
autonomy but at the same time entails low political influence. In contrast, within a 
logic of influence (i.e. where receptiveness to the demands of state institutions 
prevails), the wish for political influence – combined with a state institution’s wish 
for ‘free’ services – might drive a business association towards authoritarian 
corporatism. As mentioned, in its extreme state enforced form the association will be 
stripped of both autonomy and political influence, as the state (and not the 
association) possesses the monopoly of violence at the end of the day (cf. Figure 1). 
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2.3. The rise and fall of the Danish Buttermark Association 
Although useful, the theoretical framework of Schmitter and Streeck appears too 
rigoristic when employed on real-world events. For example, we can learn from the 
case of the cooperation between the Buttermark Association and the Danish state 
1900-12 that major political influence can in fact be obtained at the expense of 
relatively little loss of autonomy. However, transgressing a ‘tipping point’ may 
‘ruin’ the trade-off relation and instead lead to loss of both associational 
autonomy/member support and political influence as a consequence of authoritarian 
corporatism – even in a fully democratic state. This was exactly what happened to 
BA after the implementation of Law of Trade with, and Import and Export of, 
Agricultural Products of March 30, 1906 – also termed the Lur Brand Law – as 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
[Fig. 2] 
 
Figure 2 condensates the story of the rise and fall of the Buttermark Association that 
will be told in the following. In contrast to Figure 1, which is an ideal-world model 
(classical trade-off), Figure 2 is a real-world model that attempts to incorporate the 
specific historical context of a unique case. Hence, instead of a linear relationship 
between associational autonomy and political influence, a more complex relationship 
appears, in which an increase of one unit of political influence not automatically 
leads to one drop of one unit of associational autonomy. Instead we see a rapid 
increase in political influence from a zero-point in 1900 (i.e. the year BA was 
established) to 1906 (i.e. the year the lur brand law took effect) – an increase that 
however did not damage associational autonomy and member support seriously. 
However, after the passing of the law, BA appears to have transgressed a tipping 
point and subsequently lost both autonomy and influence until the association finally 
was dissolved in 1912.  
 From a power perspective, what we see then is that, despite the fact that the lur 
brand trademark turns out to be economically profitable and exemplary for 
successful state-private sector “co-branding”20, the crucial event of the 
implementation of the lur brand law in March 1906 marks a tipping point from 
corporatism based on balanced reciprocity to authoritarian corporatism implying 
unequal power relations. Hence the sources document that, after 1906, the dairy 
sector felt that it lost both associational autonomy and political influence. The reason 
for this was that the new Ministry of Agriculture (established May 22, 1896) to an 
increasing degree ‘dictated’ the terms of the use of the trademark as well as added 
new regulations outside the control of the dairy sector. This development culminated 
in the transformation of the lur brand into a state trademark in 1911. 
 
3. Presentation of case and sources 
3.1. The downside of a success history 
As indicated above, Higgins and Mordhorst hold a very positive picture of the 
cooperation between the dairy sector and the Danish state. In their view the Danish 
butter export success in the decades around 1900 was due to a timely and beneficial 
intervention of the Danish government. This intervention led to the development of 
an effective, state-guaranteed lur brand designed to counter-act fraudulent sale and 
adulteration of milk, secure inspection of dairies, support research within the dairy 
5 
 
sector, allow for persecution of vendors of false Danish butter, etc. In this article, I 
will however argue that this is only half of the story. Confer Figure 2, I will show 
that BA reached a balance between associational autonomy and political influence at 
the introduction of the 1906-law. After this ‘tipping point’, however, the association 
quickly lost both autonomy and political influence. This weakened trust and 
cooperative relations between the Danish state on the one side, and the dairy sector 
specifically as well as Danish agriculture generally on the other. 
 
3.2. Taking care of ‘the Danish gold’ 
As already mentioned, BA was established as a peak organization for agricultural 
associations with a shared interest in the highly successful Danish dairy sector. Since 
the mid-1890s, the production of butter in particular had significantly increased, due 
to improved export opportunities of what at that time was known as ‘the Danish 
Gold’ (Figure 3).21 
 
[Fig. 3] 
 
Butter exports were supported by newly established, regional butter export 
associations, and production was eased by technological improvements within dairy 
microbiology and dairy machinery, such as the development of the continuous milk 
centrifuge, pasteurization systems, refrigeration equipment etc.22 The butter export 
had an enormous national economic importance, which is indicated by the 
percentage of its value of the total Danish export – see Figure 4. 
 
[Fig. 4] 
 
BA was chaired by one of the most active and influential organizers within Danish 
agriculture at that time, farmer Anders Nielsen (1859-1928).23 The objective of the 
association was to “call upon help from the legislative power” in order to further 
strengthen export of Danish butter.24 This was done by inventing and implementing 
an obligatory and state-guaranteed trademark of high quality that should be burned or 
stamped upon all Danish butter packaging (export as well as home market) so that 
these products would become more recognizable and attractive for consumers and 
thus further increase a brand value that partly compensated for higher prices, in a 
good circle.25 This was formulated in the following way in article 5 in the 
abovementioned 1906 Lur Brand Law:  
 
By royal arrangement, a common mark applying to the whole country must (…) be placed on 
all packaging of butter (…) produced in the country. The packaging of all Danish butter that is 
exported must be provided with this mark.26 
 
Such a trademark was primarily established to serve the British market, which was 
around 10 times larger than the second largest export market, Germany, where the lur 
trademark was registered four years later, in 1905 – see Figure 5. 
 
[Fig. 5] 
 
As a peak organization – that is, an organization comprising a number of interest 
associations within a particular sector in society – the BA was designed to negotiate 
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with public authorities. For the same reason, it was particularly vulnerable to state 
influence and consequent internal riots among members.27 In the decade before 
World War I, the board members had regular negotiations with the Danish state in 
order to obtain a law-supported brand that should guarantee that only high-quality 
Danish butter was sold. However, during the period the Danish Ministry of 
Agriculture would take on an increasingly commanding tone and not automatically 
follow the requests put forward by the BA board. This development came as a the 
great chock to the farmers – a chock that quickly spread from the dairy sector into all 
other agricultural sectors as well, laying the ground for subsequent severe clashes 
with the, due to World War I, highly regulatory Danish state 1916-18. 
 
3.3. Corporatism in the making 
What we see, then, is an interesting case of corporatism in the making. For the first 
time in modern Danish agriculture, a long corporatist track was followed. This 
happened in the form of a gradual and somewhat ‘insidious’ slide on a slippery slope 
seen from the perspective of the farmers – from self-organization and full 
independence to state control and state dependence. Farmers indeed saw the results 
as economically profitable, as state sanctioning would (and could!) guarantee the 
effectiveness of their new butter trademark and, hence, increase sales. However, at 
the same time the slide from full organizational freedom to dependence on state 
agencies ‘dictating’ the behavior of formerly proud and fully independent farmers 
was seen as downright humiliating. 
 This development reflects a new international trend in the relationship between 
states and farmers at that time, namely the urgent demand for a more regulated 
agriculture, as for example can been in the case of the meat industry.28 This 
regulation was not merely dictated from above, from the state power. It was partly 
sought after by consumers – in this case British consumers who wanted to be sure 
about the origin of the butter – partly by retailers, and partly by the producers 
themselves. The dilemma of the positive and negative consequences of political 
regulation has prevailed in most countries ever since, in particular after World War 
II, and it can clearly be observed in today’s relationship between the Danish state and 
the agricultural associations.29 As such, the Danish case mirrors similar 
developments towards agricultural corporatism in countries like USA, where an 
increasingly powerful Department of Agriculture developed from the 1880s to the 
1930s30, in Japan where – similar to the Danish case – especially leaders within the 
agricultural cooperative enterprises became engaged in policy-making as well31, and 
in Western European countries such as England32 and the Scandinavian countries.33 
 
3.4. The sources 
To investigate the development of the BA, I have used both primary and secondary 
sources. Secondary sources have been used to account for the organizational context 
of the establishment of BA and include a number of authoritative works by 
agricultural, economic and business historians. As no thorough and coherent account 
of the BA exists, I have used primary sources as well. The most important primary 
sources consist of printed articles primarily taken from the weekly magazine for the 
Danish Cooperative Enterprises, The Cooperative Magazine (Andelsbladet, abbr. 
Ab), yearbooks 1900-1, 1903-5, 1907-12. Apart from a few debate articles, I have 
used the BA minutes from board and general assembly meetings published in The 
7 
 
Cooperative Magazine. The articles in Andelsbladet are of course public documents, 
which may hide important things going on ‘behind the curtains’. To get access to less 
public arenas, I have used the book Excertps from the previous history of the BA as 
well as an Account of the first 5 years of work (Uddrag af D.M.S. Forhistorie samt 
Beretning om de første 5 Aaars Virksomhed), issued in 1906 by the BA board 
represented by the chairman Anders Nielsen. Besides, I have used archive material 
from the Danish National Business Archives, primarily letters from state 
commissioner of the Danish sales of butter in England, Harald Faber, who – together 
with Anders Nielsen – was a main driving in conceiving and implementing the 
Danish lur brand.   
 
4. The rise and fall of the Buttermark Association  
4.1. Background 
As in many Western countries, liberalism reigned in Denmark during most of the 19th 
century, while corporatism dominated during the 20th century. Especially in the 
decades around 1900, a lot of peak and umbrella organizations were formed – the so-
called ‘co-working’ organizations, termed samvirker, most of which were 
purposively designed for state cooperation. They also included many agricultural 
associations which, since the middle of the 19th century, largely had been organized 
as cooperative associations.34 Agricultural corporatism escalated during World War I 
and culminated in the establishment of a near all encompassing35 peak interest 
organization in 1919, the so-called Agricultural Council. As the name indicates, this 
council was formed in order to allow Danish farmers to give running advice to, and 
negotiate directly with, the state on important, agricultural matters. The Council 
became particularly active and powerful in the growing agricultural corporatism 
during the crisis stricken 1930s, including influence on agricultural state subsidy 
programs.36 
 The first serious attack on trade liberalism in agriculture came in connection 
with the so-called Butter War 1887-1888, also called The Margarine War.37 Similar 
to what happened in other Western countries like USA38, many farmers struggled for 
“clean country”, that is, they wanted the state to take action against the industrial 
artificial butter, margarine, which in Denmark had been produced since 1883.39 The 
advocators of protectionism sought alliance with the state power. Consequently, in 
1885 a motion of a new law was carried with the purpose of guaranteeing export of 
‘clean’ butter, not least to the profitable English market, by requiring that artificial 
butter should be clearly labeled margarine.40 A second ‘margarine law’ of 1888 
prohibited the coloring of margarine.41 In this way, The Butter War triggered 
collaboration between agricultural associations and the state power, however at a 
relatively low scale, as it mostly became an internal strife between politicians.42 
However, the concerns for securing a non-adulterated, high-quality butter with an 
ascertained country of origin continued through the 1890s. 
 During the crisis from the mid 1870s to the 1890s, the price level of 
agricultural products had fallen with 20-25%, but the years from the end of the 1890s 
to World War I became an economic upturn for Danish agriculture with general price 
increases approximating 30%. The price improvement was accompanied by 
modernization of Danish agriculture leading to increased productivity and increase in 
both the quantity and value of agricultural exports. Despite strengthened competition 
from the industrial, trade and transport sectors, the agricultural sector’s contribution 
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to the GDP was holding steady at around one third of the total.43 The value of 
exported butter peaked about 1900, making up roughly 40% of the total value of 
Danish exports.44 90% or more of Danish butter production was exported to Great 
Britain. 
 
[Fig. 5] 
 
4.2. Establishment of Danish Dairies’ Buttermark Association 
One of the most prominent and powerful mediators between state and agriculture 
was the abovementioned farmer and agronomist Anders Nielsen. This mediating role 
was perfect for Nielsen, who himself was both an active politician (e.g. MP 1908-9) 
and founder and chairman of a host of agricultural interest associations. Besides, 
Nielsen was editor of one of the most important mouthpieces of Danish agriculture at 
that time, The Cooperative Magazine (Andelsbladet), issued for the first time in year 
1900. Nielsen took a particular interest in the dairy sector and, not least, the export of 
butter. Hence, in 1904 he founded Danish Dairies’ Cooperative Butter Export 
Association, which would get support from dairies from the whole country.45 In 
1899, Nielsen had taken an active part in the discussion of a joint trademark for 
Danish butter, the aim of which was to prevent that “Danish butter home and in 
England was confused with foreign butter”.46 At the end of the 19th c., “Danish 
butter” was not only used by foreign dairies and butter traders as a false trademark. 
Also an increasing number of Danish dairies and butter traders imported foreign 
butter and exported it under the label of Danish butter, in particularly in 
Copenhagen.47 
 The idea of a trademark that “could not be easily reproduced”48 was not new. It 
was formulated for the first time in 1888 by agricultural experts. Three years later, in 
1891, a law bill was proposed by 6 parliament members suggesting that barrels of 
butter should be supplied with a national trademark and that these barrels “must only 
be bought or sold (..) if they contain Danish butter”.49 Further, in 1896 a committee 
was established. Among the members was the future chairman of BA, Anders 
Nielsen. The minutes from the meetings in this committee show that the idea of a 
state trademark was introduced right from the start. Hence, at a meeting in March 
1897 five points were proposed as a basis for…  
 
guarding us against foreign butter being sold as Danish in England”, the three most important 
being 1) “to require that all Danish butter should be labeled “Danish Produce””, 2) “to require 
that all foreign butter is marked with names of local origins, which not must be erased”, 3) “to 
offer that the Government makes a registration of all Danish dairies that want to join, as well as 
assign them a registration number or name, which must not be erased, and require that the 
Government keep control of [these dairies]50 
  
In these early meetings, a recurrent argument for a trademark was the “protection of 
the good reputation of the Danish butter and its good market in England”, and as 
“Danish butter is better than the majority of butter from other origins exported to 
England, the state trademark will prove important as a tool to discern between 
Danish and foreign butter”.51 In this way, it would be possible to keep Danish 
agriculture “a horse head in front of all others”, as it was expressed.52 Moreover, the 
initiative was based on a moral campaign as well, which for example is revealed in a 
letter of Nov. 1902 from the state commissioner of Danish butter sales in England, 
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Harald Faber, who together with Nielsen became the most important architect behind 
the lur brand.53 However, a row of difficulties quickly arose – difficulties that were 
to afflict the BA in many years to come. These difficulties mainly consisted in 
problems with both Danish and English law, how to design an efficient trademark 
that could be formally registered, how to solve all the technical problems54 associated 
with implementing such a trademark (numbering, package, customs duty, registration 
of dairies, etc.) and, most importantly, how to finance and keep effective control, 
including detection and punishment of swindlers. It was realized that the original 
1891 bill had failed due to the impossibility of carrying out such a task in real life. 
Thus it was stated by the chairman of the committee, J.C. la Cour: 
 
It is definitely not the first time this case has been introduced to the legislative power; on the 
contrary, it has been the object of intense and sharp debate, and those people who wanted to 
promote this case gradually realized (…) the great difficulties [and that] what the law bill 
intends cannot be achieved.55 
 
Besides, there was a fear that the trademark simply would function as a lowest 
common denominator (Egaliseringsmærke) rather than a mark of high quality 
(Nielsen 1906, pp. 15, 18). 
 Apart from technical problems and the fear that a trademark should turn out to 
be economically counterproductive, there was a more fundamental dispute about 
whether using the trademark should be voluntary or compulsory.56 In the first case, 
the assistance of the state was not needed, which indeed suited the dominant 
liberalistic mindset among farmers of that time.57 However, the downside was the 
risk that not all dairies would join. If the trademark was made compulsory, the 
farmers would certainly need the assistance of the state, not only in order to 
introduce a new law but also to secure subsequent, effective control, which otherwise 
would become “incalculable” for the farmers themselves.58 The downside was the 
risk of being subjugated to the “welfare of the state” (Statens Forsorg).59 To start 
with, the general opinion was that “all dairies would apply a state trademark without 
compulsion”60, as it was expressed by Nielsen at a meeting in March 1897. The 
evident disadvantages of such an agreement however gradually made the BA board 
members change their minds. 
 So we see that, in the last years of the 19th century, the matter was eagerly 
discussed but no real solution was achieved.61 Local farmers and dairies became 
increasingly impatient. For example, at a meeting in The Coordinating Dairy 
Associations in Jutland in 1899 the following typical resolution was agreed upon: 
“The representatives of the dairies will do everything they can to hinder that Danish 
butter at home and in England is confused with foreign butter”.62 At the request of 
several of the leading men in the dairy industry, here not least the Danish agricultural 
commissioner in charge of British butter exports, Harald Faber, London63, together 
with English purchasers and vendors tired of the bad stories of Danish butter in the 
English press,64 Danish Dairies’ Buttermark Association was finally founded at a 
meeting in September 1900. The famous Danish lur brand, which the association 
introduced hereafter, had a major significance for sales – not only as a guarantee of 
origin but also as a guarantee of quality65, because dairies simply were excluded if 
they did not deliver high-quality butter.66 Hence, it certainly did fulfill “its purpose of 
consolidating the excellent reputation of Danish butter”.67 Indeed, it became so 
successful and well-known that the concept later was to be copied in other 
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countries.68 Not least thanks to the association’s dedicated chairman, Anders Nielsen, 
all dairies quickly joined voluntarily, and by July 1906 1315 dairies were members, 
which meant nearly all Danish dairies, cf. Figure 6.69 
 
[Fig. 6] 
 
The idea of the lur was conceived by farmer Rasmus Rasmussen on a trip to 
Copenhagen in autumn 1900. In a quite annoyed mood, he was returning back from a 
futile meeting in the Buttermark Association, where members again had failed to 
agree upon a national butter quality brand. Rasmussen later remembered that, while 
standing at a ferry deck at night and looking up at the starry sky, he suddenly got the 
idea: “I want to blow it all away and then, picture myself a lur blower who puts the 
lur to his mouth. In that moment I knew that the lur was the symbol we had looked 
for”. October 23, 1901, the lur brand was finally registered in England after huge 
problems with getting the registration approved.70 The logo showed four interlaced 
lures with the inscription “Danish Butter” (Figure 7). 
 
[Fig. 7] 
 
4.3. The years 1900-1906: the development of a strong interest organization  
In general, Danish agricultural associations had significant influence on agricultural 
politics in the decades around 1900, exemplified by the establishment of a law of 
cooperative enterprises 1909-17.71 As mentioned, the ‘Butter war’ had been 
precedent for quid pro quo cooperation between the dairy sector and the ministry of 
agriculture. Another more recent example was the successful 1898 law – the first of 
its kind in the world – on mandatory pasteurization of the cream from which the 
butter was churned.72 Now, resuming what they referred to as the “legislation road”73 
the BA board wanted the remaining dairies to join. However, in the beginning 
Nielsen and his fellow board members did not succeed to get any legal help from the 
state.  
 As mentioned before, there were eager disputes on whether dairies should join 
voluntarily or compulsory, by the help of the state.74 In 1903 the board nevertheless 
made a dramatic change of paragraph 2 in the articles, shifting from a principle of 
voluntariness to enforcement. The original statement “The Board provides a 
trademark registered in Denmark and England [which] will be used for all butter that 
the members produce for sales” was changed to “All export butter must carry the lur 
brand logo”.75 In his annual report for the year 1903, Anders Nielsen explained the 
following about the change in paragraph 2 and the increased self-control within the 
dairy sector this implied:  
 
Now that it has turned out to be impossible with the help of the law to hold responsible those of 
our members, who will not comply with the board on matters concerning the control of butter, 
there is no other way than to make members aware that we ourselves have to provide that 
guard of our [lur] trademark that the law does not offer. [Therefore] we must state in our laws 
that members can be punished by paying penalties, if they order a trademark in any form from 
elsewhere.76 
 
The shift from voluntariness to coercion was made even clearer in December 1903 
when the BA asked the Liberal government to raise a bill of “A Law of Trade with 
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Butter” in parliament. By this was meant a statutory trademark encompassing all 
Danish butter – export as well as home market butter. Here BA proposed a 
compulsory use of the lur brand, which should be owned by an agricultural 
organization (BA itself or another dairy organization). A division of labor was 
outlined, in which the role of the Ministry of Agriculture primarily was to control 
that the law was not broken (paragraph 8). Moreover, BA emphasized their great 
success in making the Danish dairies join the association voluntarily.77 Thus, 
immediately after the proposal it was added: 
 
After only 2 years of work on the road of voluntariness, we have achieved that (..) all Danish 
export butter carries the lur brand – only 15 dairies are not members of the Buttermark 
Association (..). It will therefore be in the interest of the whole dairy sector to introduce a law 
that requires that all Danish export butter must carry the lur brand. Such a law will at home [in 
Denmark] only be of formal nature; but in England it will offer a security of the national origin, 
such as the Buttermark Association, whatever efforts it makes, not could attain by its own 
authority.78 
 
Moreover, the moral argument was again stressed: 
 
The conditions are so unhealthy that honest trade (..) cannot survive in the competition, as it is 
now displayed in the whole country”.79 And what regards state control, it was added that “it is 
up to the Ministry to decide [how to deal with lawbreakers]. However, the margarine control 
will probably be able to carry out this control as well.80 
 
In the Cooperative Magazine in 1904, Nielsen first emphasized the progress the BA 
had made by including the dairies on a voluntary basis. However, he now warned: 
 
But the day the control is slackened either through inadequate execution, or that we due to 
inadequate mutual solidarity neglect to fill out the holes, which are created due to changing 
trade conditions, or as the legislation’s shortages are revealed, then the utility, which the 
association has had in promoting honest and trustworthy butter trade, will be destroyed. To 
make this arrangement stable and encompassing all Danish butter for export as well as all 
butter in retail trade [in Denmark], we have called upon the help of the legislative power.81 
 
This statement clearly expresses the slide from self-dependence and voluntariness to 
political influence, legal compulsion and state dependence – cf. the model in Figure 
1. That is to say that Nielsen and BA had ended in a classical dilemma of 
corporatism, attempting to balance between Schmitter and Steecks’ two logics 
mentioned above. In line with a logic of membership they had to promote core values 
of a ‘cooperative ideology’ based on voluntariness, democracy and member 
influence to forestall critical voices from ‘within’, that is, among fellow farmers. In 
line with a logic of influence they wanted to provide a permanent good for the dairy 
sector. And, they were convinced, this good could only be provided with the help of 
the state power and, hence, statutory compulsion. 
 Finding himself in such dire straits, it becomes less surprising that Anders 
Nielsen in his annual report for the year 1904 underscored the compulsory element of 
the fruit of BA’s lobbying work – the bill on “Trade with and Import and Export of 
Agricultural Products” proposed by the Minister of Agriculture – a bill that was 
exactly in line with the wishes of the BA and their partners. Besides, he added, there 
was in parliament an understanding that the BA should administer the law itself “so 
that the representatives of the dairies will get the matter in their own hand under 
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similar organizational forms as previously”.82 Hence, put in theoretical terms Nielsen 
and BA hoped to mediate between the two logics of business-state cooperation and 
thus achieve an optimum in the form of balanced reciprocity in a win-win exchange: 
The state provides a collective good for all citizens (increased export of butter, which 
is good for the whole nation’s economy) and does it for ‘free’, that is, without paying 
the costs of control and monitoring; while the business association provides a shared 
good for all their members (compulsory use of the trademark leading to increased 
quality, better reputation and increased incomes for its members) and still preserves 
associational autonomy.83 
 The intention was now that the new trademark law – supported by the 
abovementioned pasteurization law – should enforce the common good. This was out 
from the reason that when “the lur brand guarantees that the butter is Danish and the 
state guarantees that Danish butter is pasteurized, then the lur brand will to the 
customer be the only guarantee that the butter is pasteurized”.84 
 Within dairy circles no-one could seriously deny that the lur brand case was a 
good case – just like its predecessor, the pasteurization case. Nevertheless, critical 
voices were heard. For instance, in 1901 the magazine Butter Tidings (Smørtidende) 
brought a row of articles criticizing the butter trademark. The main arguments in 
these articles were summarized in an article in Nielsen’s own Cooperative Magazine 
in 1901. In the article, it was sarcastically said that the butter trademark in 
Copenhagen as well as in London had been received with “complete indifference”. 
Further, one reads: 
 
Time has taught us to look with both gentle and resigned eyes upon the reforms for the 
furtherance of the butter export, which the gentlemen consultants bring forth (..) Only we are 
still in doubt whether the disadvantages and dangers [that the butter trademark involve] are not 
greater than the possible advantages, which it may bring.85 
 
Such criticisms are also reflected in BA chairman Anders Nielsen’s annual report in 
1903, in which he states that there had been raised doubts about the butter trademark 
from “several, less friendly sides”.86 Later on, the critique was sharpened from the 
side of BA’s member associations within the dairy sector, where it was felt that 
members’ decision power was rapidly declining. A typical statement was made by a 
chairman of a local dairy: “The dairy associations have established the Buttermark 
Association, however it has completely taken over the command”.87 
 However, to begin with the local dairies backed up the law despite the fact that 
the BA obviously meant a violation of the co-operative ideology, which had slowly 
grown up in the single local communities, and wherein any state control and law 
regulation had been perceived as evil.88 These were clearly calmed by the rational, 
economic nature of the arguments combined with the state’s promise to the dairy 
organizations that they should administer the law themselves. In the Cooperative 
Magazine in 1905 the rapprochement towards the legislative powers was praised 
from many sides and also in the editorial preface (probably written by editor Nielsen 
himself), where the proposed bill of a mandatory butter trademark was wished a 
“happy passing”. Clearly hinting to shared, core cooperative values, it was then 
further added that “no social class can lose thereby”.89 
 With the law of March 30, 1906, the ‘good cause’ of the lur brand had been 
codified in formal law. From now on, self-discipline and voluntariness within the 
sector was backed up or, maybe rather, exchanged by legislation and threat of 
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punishment from the side of the state. So far – so good. But how did the BA balance 
the trade-off relation in the following years? 
 
[Fig. 8] 
 
4.4. The years 1907-12: associational autonomy vs. state enforcement 
For the public institution that cooperated most closely with the agrarian associations, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, the butter brand case was a determining breakthrough 
paving the way for still more regular interaction between agricultural and public 
corporate actors from the beginning of World War I and – except for a couple of 
years in the 1920s – to the end 1940s. In such an ongoing row of reciprocal 
exchanges, the dairy organizations as well as the other agricultural organizations had 
an increasing interest in gaining insight into, and actively influence, the legislative 
work – especially seen in the light of the state bureaucracy taking an increasingly 
powerful role in society from the turn of the century. Conversely, politicians from all 
camps had an incentive to incorporate agricultural and other business associations 
out from a general tax economic interest in being able to control, monitor and 
facilitate production, as well as a purely party-political interest in being able to 
legitimize their legislative work to the population by referring to close collaboration 
with peak organizations within the private sector. Besides, the new Ministry of 
Agriculture may simply have had an interest in ‘getting work for itself’. Thus Anders 
Nielsen clearly alleges to ‘budget maximization’90 concerns when he writes that “the 
Ministry declared that [the lur brand law] gave it more to administer than had been 
the case with any previous law”.91 
 The sources clearly indicate that it was due to the efforts of Anders Nielsen that 
the BA was transformed from next to nothing in 1900 to one of the most powerful 
joint representations in the dairy sector from 1906 to 1912. Unlike other dairy 
organizations, it included all dairies.92 This was clearly one of the reasons why 
Anders Nielsen did not want to close down the association after the lur brand law had 
been passed, and the association’s raison d’être had disappeared. Those members 
who cautiously voiced a desire to leave the whole matter to the state after the lur 
brand had been turned into a state trademark were severely put in place by their 
chairman. At the annual general assembly meeting in 1907, such a line of thought 
was formally dismissed with the somewhat surprising argument that the association 
“has its origins back in the past century” and therefore “is not related to present day’s 
ideas of autonomy”. This did not prevent Anders Nielsen, who in the first quarter of 
the 20th century was the driving force behind a host of centrally staged and centrally 
managed co-operative associations, to see himself as an advocate of autonomy and 
power decentralization. It was exactly the vision – or illusion – of an equal 
partnership with the state, which was the basis for this somewhat paradoxical world 
view: 
 
I do not praise the view that you should leave more to the state than necessary – on the 
contrary, I praise the view that the government should keep a diligent connection with the 
organizations and hear their opinions on the matters – just like the way the present Ministry of 
Agriculture works in several areas. I think that those who attack this custom of the state fail to 
understand their time.93 
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It would quickly turn out that the BA still had a role to play after 1906. It did 
however not become that strong interest group enjoying the full support of all dairies 
that Anders Nielsen had dreamt of, and which he wanted to use as a tool in a 
harmonious collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture. Instead, BA became the 
weaker part in the negotiations with the state and gradually lost the loyalty and back-
up from their members. 
 Despite the clearly beneficial effect of the lur brand on the export market and 
Nielsen’s promises of what may be termed an ‘autonomy clause’ on the law, the 
Buttermark Association and especially its chairman were the objects of still more 
harsh criticisms – both internally and externally – in the years leading up to World 
War I. There was a general distaste of Nielsen’s way of either patronizing or 
threatening members, which internally – within the agricultural cooperative 
movements – was intended to keep order in the lines and externally to defend the 
cooperative associations against urban critics who wanted to “undermine the co-
operative cause”.94 The controversy can also be detected in Nielsen’s relationship 
with state commissioner Harald Faber, with whom he had collaborated closely on a 
state trademark since the year 1900 – a relationship that somewhat cooled down after 
1906. Thus, the numerous letters from Faber to Nielsen before the trademark law in 
1906 indicate that a friendship between the two slowly developed.95 Although they 
continued to share a common interest in the case and solving various technical 
problems, a fundamental disagreement is revealed – most explicitly in a letter of 
March 11, 1907. Here the state employee Harald Faber reveals his loyalty to the 
Ministry of Agriculture in an, for him, unusually direct manner. First, he informs 
Nielsen that he has “recommended [that the trademark] is registered in the name of 
the Ministry itself [signed by the Head of the Ministry Department]”. Later on, he 
adds: 
 
When you [Anders Nielsen] talk about possible dissatisfaction among dairy people and a 
feeling that you could just as well have arranged everything by use of an organization of 
dairies, then I fully agree with you, however only on the assumption that we have been so 
reasonable to resign ourselves to that excellent arrangement we made at the establishment of 
the Buttermark Association and kept the state outside and not demanded the trademark 
protected by law.96 
 
In a letter of April 23, we find the same reasoning in connection with the BA’s 
proposal to change the control numbers implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture 
– an acknowledgement of the state taking over, a message that Faber apparently tries 
to convey to Nielsen without hurting his feelings too much:  
 
I am sorry to say that I am not enthusiastic about the new proposal [from BA], and that my 
opinion is that it will weaken control of frauds (..). Maybe I do not quite understand your 
purpose, however I cannot help to think that if the [lur brand] numbers are included in the 
announcements of the Ministry, then a significant part of the remaining raison d’être of BA 
disappears (..) In other words, the lur numbers will end like the lur brand: when one gives up 
the voluntary, mutual coercion in order to delegate work and responsibility to the 
administration, one will experience a much higher degree of coercion.97 
 
A much more concrete and explicit disagreement can be seen in the complaints over 
all the inconveniences the law caused in the daily work at the local dairies. As a 
consequence, Anders Nielsen and the other members of the BA consisting of dairy 
managers and dairy associations were forced to try to get the law revised. They 
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however failed. Gradually, political influence was slipping out of their hands. In 
1910 it was therefore a disillusioned chairman who stated: 
 
It was our precondition that the Ministry in its administration of the trademark law would 
approach the [BA] organization and lean on its experience, wishes and advice. In the 
beginning, the Ministry was fully in accordance with such a view (..) and the Ministry wrote: 
As the administration is laid in the hand of the Buttermark Association, the association can 
decide over a number of details, and it must have an extensive freedom of action (..) However, 
soon a change took place [and the Ministry] showed an increasing reluctance to follow our 
directions.98 
 
The negotiations on the revisions of the law 1908-1911 did not only become a 
failure, they totally reversed the power balance between BA and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. A ‘good’ case, which solely was supposed to be quickly confirmed by 
the state and then left again in the hands of the farmers, ended up in law stickling and 
ultimately in enforced legislation, that is, a legislation stripped of self-governance 
and self-control seen from the perspective of dairy people. 
 This nightmare began after the dairies and their organizations, as a follow-up 
of the 1906 law, had been pressing for the passing of a law concerning a limit value 
of water contents in export butter. The Ministry’s public servants were at this time 
already at work with revising the 1906 law, for which reason such a regulation could 
fittingly be put into this new bill. However, the dairy organizations had a most 
peripheral role in these negotiations – so that, already in 1908, the BA felt obliged to 
request the Ministry that the dairy organizations could “get an opportunity to speak 
before a possible revision of the law took place”. “There was”, Anders Nielsen 
continued, “reason to request this, since [the ministerial officials] did not go to the 
dairy organizations for advice before the law was passed and the time for it to come 
into force was determined”.99 
 When the BA members had finally achieved to express their wishes at the 
negotiation table, they found out at the release of the ministry’s bill in the beginning 
of 1910 that some regulations concerning health and cleanliness had been added 
without their knowing, even though it was explicitly stated in the bill that these 
added regulations were worked out “in consultation with representatives from the 
joint representations of the dairies and the trade business”; moreover, an added part 
on state control of dairies, which had equally been made “after recommendations 
from the joint representations of the dairies”.100 These additions came as a shock for 
many within the dairy sector. As it was written on February 25, 1910, in the 
magazine Dairy News: 
 
[All these supplementary regulations] we could have understood, as long as it had been the 
dairy industry, which had made a wish to the state about authorizing these regulations, but that 
the state will force it through is to us incomprehensible.101  
 
In answer to this bill, and with the knowledge that the bill could not be changed 
substantially, the dairy organizations sent a resolution to the Ministry, wherein they 
as a minimum demanded that the quite ‘clingy’ term “in consultation with” be 
replaced with the somewhat more neutral “after recommendation from”.102 This 
demand was completely overlooked by the agricultural minister, who even used the 
phrase “in consultation with” many more times in the revised draft of the bill. 
Moreover, the agricultural minister redefined the wording “in consultation with”. By 
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this was meant that, after one such consultation, “the Ministry afterwards decides 
whether the wishes put forward at the consultation can be granted”.103 Regarding the 
highly controversial provision on state dairy control, several of the dairy 
organizations had immediately declared themselves against “that there be hired state 
government officials undertaking the control”. Instead, they offered to undertake the 
task themselves.104 
 
[Fig. 9] 
 
During 1906-12, BLA member critique became increasingly merciless. In an article 
from 1910, Nielsen and a fellow board member could not help regretting and 
complaining: 
 
We hardly knew the word critique before the participation of the Ministry had been determined 
by law, and even at that time [in 1906] all cooperative dairies joined the Buttermark 
Association; in total there were at that time (..) only 13 – thirteen – dairies in the country, 
which were not member of the association.105 
 
Things even worsened when the third reading of the bill at the parliament saw its 
light in spring 1911. Under paragraph 7 the Ministry had, for whatever reason, made 
the addition that the lur brand should be erased from the Danish trademark register. 
This would mean that the trademark could probably be used in England but not in 
other European countries – something that was outrageous and completely 
unacceptable to the BA. As a consequence, the trademark was finally given to the 
state – something that was officially declared in a statute of March 9, 1911 and 
confirmed at an extraordinary BA assembly in April, 1911. The association’s last 
annual general meeting in April 1912 was marked by self-critical reflections and a 
general loathing of a supposedly simple and honorable case, which ended up being 
highly “blurred” and “complicated”, and which never should have been brought 
before the legislative power.106 Thus, Nielsen concluded that… 
 
this regulation [under paragraph 7] is fatal, because by adding it the proposer – the Ministry of 
Agriculture – has prevented itself and the legal power from fulfilling the wishes [of the 
organizations within the dairy sector] to obtain an authorized lur brand and, by the help of the 
state, to provide Denmark with the greatest protection and the exclusive right to use it. 
However, by erasing it from the trademark register its authority and our exclusive right to use it 
have been undermined.107 
 
The articles in Andelsbladet show that the board members repeatedly confirmed each 
other in the fact that they would counter-act the expected merciless critique from the 
dairy associations with a declaration on a complete unconditional surrender of the lur 
brand to the state, which is why the Ministry of Agriculture alone could be held 
accountable for the design of the law, allowing the BA to “clearly disclaim the 
responsibility of paragraph 7”.108 
 Thus we see that, during 1906-12, BA member critique became increasingly 
merciless. What had they gained from this transaction – for ‘selling out’ the farmers’ 
self-governance? Nothing! declared Anders Nielsen and a fellow board member in an 
article from 1910, and not without bitterness, after a wave of hard personal critique 
from inside and outside the BA.109 Hence, we may conclude from this case that it is a 
simplification to talk about a classical trade-off relation between associational 
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autonomy and political influence when cooperating with the state. Even in 
democratic, non-totalitarian states such as Denmark, it may be difficult to reach a 
balance of reciprocity as the one found in an ‘ideal’ corporatism in Keeler’s 
understanding, that is, access to “public policy-making process” in exchange for 
“certain benefits”.110 Therefore, the challenge for the interest organization seems to 
be not to transgress the tipping point that seriously disturbs the balance between 
autonomy and political influence – similar to what did the BA in ‘greedy’ search for 
even more political influence. Instead, it should attempt to keep a certain distance to 
the state body after having exerted political influence, e.g. on state legislation. 
 The glory and fall of BA should of course also be seen in the specific historical 
context of the rapid growth of butter exports and a new Ministry of Agriculture, 
which increasingly wanted to secure this growth. Hence, in a way BA became a 
victim of its own success. It contributed significantly to boost the exports of Danish 
butter and, as such, the national economic value of this sector. To safeguard this 
economic success, the Danish state gradually took over responsibility from a 
voluntary farmers’ interest organization. Milk producers and dairies saw this as a 
violation and an attempt to overrule the sector. However, one may also interpret the 
behavior of employees within the Ministry of Agriculture as a highly rational attempt 
to safeguard ‘the Danish gold’. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As shown in historical studies, it may be risky for voluntary business associations to 
cooperate closely with the state. Trapped in an apparent trade-off relation between a 
‘logic of membership’ and a ‘logic of influence’111, these associations may profit 
from cooperation in the form of increased political influence. The cost may however 
turn out to be loss of associational autonomy leading to increasingly alienated and 
dissatisfied members. Within this theoretical framework, the article addressed the 
question: Why did the Buttermark Association specifically, and Danish dairies and 
milk producers more generally, wish to cooperate with the state, and how did this 
cooperation develop over time? To provide an answer, it told the instructive story of 
an agricultural association trapped in the autonomy-political influence dilemma, 
namely the Danish Dairies’ Buttermark Association. During its cooperation with the 
Danish Ministry of Agriculture on the famous butter lur brand 1900-12, it turned out 
that the relation between associational autonomy and political influence developed as 
a trade-off relation until the law on mandatory use of the lur brand by all Danish 
dairies came into force in March 30, 1906 – although the drop in autonomy and the 
concomitant member support was very small in comparison with the great political 
influence achieved. However, after 1906 both autonomy, member support as well as 
political influence slipped rapidly away, transforming cooperation into authoritarian 
corporatism based on unbalanced reciprocity in favor of the state. 
 At the turn of the century, it had seemed so simple to everyone within the 
Danish dairy sector to get cooperation with the state on track. However, cooperation 
ended with – as it was drily stated by a BA board member in 1912 – “that the 
‘contract’ between the government and the association had been terminated by the 
agricultural minister, and that they [the Buttermark Association], from the view of 
the state, had become superfluous”.112 The struggle for political influence had 
evidently been pushed too far by Nielsen and his fellow board members, 
transgressing the tipping point between associational autonomy and corporatism. 
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Going down the corporatist track, BA expected unbalanced reciprocity in its own 
favor (making the Ministry of Agriculture ‘follow our directions’) from start to end. 
However, the relationship with the Ministry actually led to an extremely unbalanced 
reciprocity in favor of the Ministry (‘after a consultation the Ministry decides’), that 
is, authoritarian corporatism, leaving BA stripped of both associational autonomy 
and political influence, until it finally was dissolved in 1912. 
 In this sense, the corporatist strategy had failed, even though the lur brand both 
then and now is an economic success story. By 1910, BA in fact became increasingly 
useless and redundant in the eyes of both members ‘inside’ the dairy sector and state 
actors ‘outside’. Hence, voluntary provision of a shared good within the sector was 
fully overtaken by the state, and the lur brand was finally turned into a state 
trademark in spring 1911. 
 Hence we see that corporatism may be a win-win game when balanced 
reciprocity is obtained. It may however be very difficult to achieve this delicate 
balance – even in democratic, non-totalitarian states. Therefore, the challenge for the 
interest organization seems to be not to transgress the tipping point that seriously 
disturbs the balance between autonomy and political influence but, rather, seek to 
remain fully independent after having exerted political influence, e.g. on state 
legislation, alternatively voluntarily dissolve itself in case main objectives have been 
achieved. The story of the Danish Buttermark Association clearly tells that 
cooperation may quickly end up with ‘the winner takes it all’. And, most likely, the 
winner will be the state. 
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Figure 1. Cooperation between interest associations and the state: The trade-off 
relation between interest associations’ autonomy and their political influence (model 
figure). 
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Figure 2. Cooperation between interest associations and the state: Balancing 
associational autonomy and political influence. The case of the cooperation between 
the Buttermark Association and the Danish state, 1900-1912. 
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Figure 3. Butter production in Denmark, 1870-1914 (in thousand tons). Source: 
Bjørn (1982, p. 124). 
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Figure 4. Production and export of Danish butter, 1900-1965. Reproduced from 
Bjørn (1982, p. 196). 
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Figure 6. Export of Danish butter to the two largest export markets, Germany and 
Great Britain/Ireland, 1902-14. Value of the export (in million DKK). Source: 
Statistiske efterretninger (Statistical reports, Denmark), vol. 1902-15. 
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Figure 7. Members (local dairies) of Danish Dairies’ Buttermark Association, 1900-
6. Source: Nielsen (1906, p. 38). 
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Figure 8. The development of the lur-brand logo. The fourth logo with the four lures 
were used in the beginning. Later on, this logo was exchanged by an elaborated 
version of the third logo with two lures. The first two logos were first drafts, which 
never came into use. The last logo is the one, which is used today. Reproduced from 
Andelsbladet and www.foodculture.dk (Date of access: 21-09-2012). 
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Figure 9. Milk coachmen at the cooperative dairy in Smidstrup between Fredericia 
and Vejle shortly after year 1900. Reproduced from Bjørn, 1982, p. 161. 
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Figure 10. Interior of the cooperative dairy in Aagaard near Kolding around year 
1900. Reproduced from Bjørn, 1982, p. 145. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Although agricultural corporatism in the EU has been diminished since the 
beginning of the 1990s (Lelieveldt and Princen, The Politics of the European Union, 
137). 
2 E.g. Jordan, ‘Pluralistic Corporatisms and Corporate Pluralism’; Streeck, ‘Between 
Pluralism and Corporatism’; Cox et al., ‘From State Direction to Self Regulation’. 
3 Schmitter and Streeck, ‘The Organisation of Business Interests’. 
4 “In perfect accordance with the national romantic preoccupation with Denmark’s 
ancient history dominating the 18th century, the curly musical instrument was able to 
simultaneously signal Danish identity, traditions and quality” (Mikkelsen, ‘En ægte 
lurmærket succes’).  
5 It should however be added that, in a letter of Dec. 2, 1899, from state 
commissioner of the Danish butter sales in London, Harald Faber, to the chairman of 
the Danish Buttermark Association, farmer Anders Nielsen, a similar Dutch 
trademark showing two cow’s horns is mentioned.  
6 See Danish Dairy Board: http://www.mejeri.dk/Aktuelt/121218_Lurpak.aspx (date 
of entry: 13-05-2013). 
7 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action. 
8 Yishai, ‘Three Faces of Associational Politics’, 124. 
9 Keeler, The Politics, 8. For a review of definitions of corporatism, see Schmitter, 
‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’  
10 Yishai, ‘Three Faces of Associational Politics’, 124. 
11 By Phillippe Schmitter named “state corporatism” (Schmitter, ‘Still the Century of 
Corporatism?’) 
12 Jessop, ‘The Capitalist State’, 152. 
13 A thorough study of deep-rooted corporatism in 20th century Italy can be found in 
Salvati, ‘The Long History of Corporatism in Italy’. Here a peculiar culture 
originating in socialism and Catholicism is seen as the key explanation of such path-
dependency – from the 1920s to 1945 specifically, and during the whole century 
generally. 
14  Chloupkova et al., ‘Building and Destroying Social Capital’.   
15 The term reciprocity comes from Latin reciprocus, returning back the same way, 
alternating (probably from re back and pro forward). In anthropology, the word has 
been used to denote informal economic exchanges in the form of people’s on-going 
exchange of goods and services, at the macro level often encapsulated in terms like 
“gift-giving”, “gift economy” and “informal economic systems”. 
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